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THE DISPOSITION OF DORMANT BANK DEPOSITS AND
OTHER UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
EAi S. WMsoN*
Many states have enacted legislation designed to effect
some disposition of such property as (1) bank deposits over
which there has been no act of ownership for a long period of
time, (2) funds deposited with public utility companies to
guarantee payment for service, which have not been claimed
for a considerable time after the service ceased, (3) unclaimed
corpus of dry trusts, (4) unclaimed funds held by courts for
distribution and (5) other dormant property
Under such statutes, some states take a defeasible title to
the property, others have attempted to take absolute title, others
take mere possession or custody of the property for the benefit
of the owner; and others merely require that public notice of
the existence of the property be given by the holder thereof.
Several interesting legal questions have arisen in connec-
tion with statutes of this type. Of these, the following appear
to be of most general interest. (1) Whether the statutes deny
due process of law, (2) whether they impair the obligation
of contracts, and (3) whether they can be constitutionally
applied to national banks or other federal instrumentalities.
Bank deposits have been the subject matter of litigation
involving these questions more frequently than any of the
other classes of property usually covered by such statutes. They
also appear to be generally representative of the group, although
there are inherent differences in the various classes of property
which have some special significance bearing on these ques-
tions, but space does not allow consideration of all the peculi-
arities of each class of property Thus, consideration will be
given herein to these questions mainly as they anse m connec-
tion with bank deposits.
* Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, Frank-
fort, Kentucky. B. S. in Commerce, Umversity of Kentucky; LL.B.,
University of Kentucky.
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DUE PROCESS AND IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
In Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone,1 the Su-
preme Court considered the validity of a Massachusetts statute
which, in the language of the court, provided in substance as
follows :2
". . . That deposits in savings banks which had remained in-
active and unclaimed for thirty years, and where the claimant was
unknown or the depositor could not be found, should be paid to the
treasurer and receiver general.
"... Before the money can be turned over to the receiver
general, proceedings must be instituted in the probate court, and,
under the decision of the supreme court of the state, personal
notice must be given to the bank, and citation and notice, usual in
the probate court, published, so as to give the depositor, if liv-
ing, and his heirs, if dead, opportunity to appear and be heard.
Even then the property is not escheated, but deposited with the
treasurer, to hold as trustee for the owner or his legal repre-
sentatives, to whom it is payable when they establish their right."
The court held that the statute did not deny due process
of law or impair the obligation of contracts. The reasons for
the court's conclusion are concisely stated in its own language
as follows :3
Savings banks are maintained in the expectation that the
deposits may, for years, remain uncalled for, to the mutual advantage
of bank and customer. So that, if the statute had provided that the
money should be paid over to the receiver general if the owner,
after a short absence, could not be found, or if the account remained
inactive for a brief period, a very different question would be pre-
sented from that arising under an act which deals with absence and
nonaction so long continued as to suggest that the law of escheats or
of lost property might be enforced. This, however, is not a statute
of escheats, since it does not proceed on the theory that the depositor
is dead, leaving no heirs. It does not purport to dispose of lost prop-
erty, but deals with a deposit the owner of which, though known,
cannot be found. The act is like those which provide for the ap-
pointment of custodians for the real and personal property of an
absentee.
"In this case, though the money is on deposit with a bank, which
has faithfully kept its contract, yet the statute proceeds on the gen-
eral principle that corporations may become involved, or may be
dissolved; or that, after long lapses of time, changes may occur which
would require someone to look after the rights of the depositor. The
statute deals with accounts of an absent owner, who has so long
failed to exercise any act of ownership as to raise the presumption
that he has abandoned his property. And if abandoned, it should
be preserved until he or his representative appears to claim it; or,
failing that, until it should be escheated to the state. The right and
power so to legislate is undoubted."
(All italics herein are the author's unless otherwise indicated.)
'221 U.S. 660, 55 L. ed. 899 (1910).
11d. at 664, 55 L. ed. 899, 903..
2 Id. at 664, 55 L. ed. 899, 902.
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In First National Bank of San Jose -v. California,4 certain
California statutes of the general type under consideration
were held unconstitutional as applied to national banks. But,
the same statutes were held constitutional as applied to state
banks in Security Savings Bank v. Califorrna.5 In. tins latter
case the court sums up the pertinent provision of the California
statutes as follows .6
" If a bank account has not been added to or drawn upon by
the depositor for more than twenty years, and no one claiming the
money has, within that period, filed with the bank any notice show-
ing his present residence, and the president or managing officer of
the bank does not know that the depositor is alive, then the bank
shall, upon entry of a judgment establishing these facts, deposit with
the state treasurer the amount of the deposit and accumulations.
The suit cannot be begun until after the expiration of the twenty
years. The statute does not effect an nnmediate escheat upon the
lapse of the twenty years. It provides for taking over the deposit
when so adjudged in the -action. A valid claim to a deposit, duly
made at any time prior to entry of the judgment, prevents its transfer
to the state.
"The procedural provision is this: The suit is brought by the
attorney general in Sacramento county Upon the bank, personal
service must be made. Upon the depositors, service is to be made
by publication of the summons for four weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation published in that county. With the summons
a notice must also be published, requiring all persons other than the
named defendants to appear and show cause why the moneys in-
volved in the suit shall not be deposited with .the state treasurer.
Any person interested may become a party to the suit. The judg-
ment to be entered requires the 'banks to forthwith deposit all such
moneys with the state treasurer, to be received, invested, accounted
for, and paid out in the same manner and by the same officers as is
provided in the case of other escheated property' For a period of
five years after entry of the judgment any person not a 'party or
privy' to it may sue the state to recover the money so received."
A significant .difference exists between the Massachusetts
statutes considered in Provident Institution for Savings v.
Malone,7 and these California statutes. Under the Massachu-
setts statutes, the state takes no titular interest in the property
but takes mere possession or custody thereof for the benefit of
its owner; whereas, under the California statutes, the state
takes a defeasible title winch becomes absolute five years from
the date of the taking, if the property is not claimed within
that tune.
4262 U. S. 366, 67 L. ed. 1030 (1922).
263 U. S. 282, 68 L. ed. 301 (1923)
'Id. at 284, 68 L. ed. 301, S05 (1923).
'221 U. S. 660, 55 L. ed. 899 (1910) cited supra, note 1.
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The contention was made in Security Savings Bank v.
Califormna,s that the California statutes denied due process of
law because -9
1. "If the proceeding is in personam, the law is invalid as to
nonresidents of the state, since they are served only by publication;
and it is invalid as to residents, because they are served by publica-
tion without a prior showing of the necessity for such service."
2. "If the proceeding is quasi in rem, the law is invalid as to all
depositors and claimants, because there is no seizure of the res, or
its equivalent; because the notice provided for is inadequate and
unreasonable; and because it is binding only on parties to the action."
3. "If the proceeding is strictly in rem, the law is invalid, be-
cause it does not provide for such seizure of the res, nor give reason-
able notice to depositors and claimants."
The court's answer to contention 1 was .10
"The proceeding is not one in personam,-at least, not so far as
concerns the depositor,"
and that under the circumstances no prior showing of the
necessity for notice by publication was necessary 13 The court
further held that publication of notice in a newspaper having
general circulation in Sacramento county instead of in a news-
paper having general circulation in the county m which -the
bank was located, was, under the circumstances, adequate con-
structive notice.
The court's answer to contentions 2 and 3 was -12
"But whether the proceedings should be described as being in
rem or as being quasi in rem is not of legal significance in this
connection. In either case the essentials of jurisdiction over the
deposits are that there be seizure of the res at the commencement of
the suit; and reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. These
requirements are satisfied by the procedure prescribed in the statutes
of California. There is a seizure or its equivalent.
"Seizure of the deposit is effected by the personal service made
upon the bank."
The court further stated .13
" Where the procedure is appropriate, neither the due
process clause nor any right of the bank under the contract clause is
8263 U. S. 282, 68 L. ed. 301 (1923) cited supra, note 5.
'Id. at 286, 68 L. ed. 301, 306.
1 Id. at 286, 68 L. ed. 301, 306.
'The fact should not be overlooked that this statute required
that notice actually be served on the bank. Statutes of the type
under consideration usually have such a provision or provide that
the bank make a report which starts the proceedings and which is
tantamount to actual notice.
263 U. S. 282, 287, 68 L. ed. 301, 306.
Id. at 287, 68 L. ed. 301, 306.
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violated by a law requiring it to pay over to the state, as depositary,
saving deposits which have long remained unclaimed.
It is clear from these Supreme Court decisions that a state
may take, pursuant to judicial proceedings, either custody of
or a defeasible title to deposits in state banks on the sole ground
that they have been dormant or inactive in the sense that there
has been no act of ownership relative to them for a long period
of time.
It has recently been held that absolute title cannot be
taken on such ground without judicial proceedings. 14
The next question which naturally arises is. Whether a
state may on the same ground take, without judicial proceed-
ings or publication of notic% mere custody or possession of bank
deposits 9
In Brooklyn Borough Gas Company v. Bennett,1 5 there
was in issue the validity of a statute which required public
utility companies to turn over to the state consumers' deposits,
when such deposits were not claimed within ten years after the
service ceased. The statute did not require any judicial pro-
ceedings or publication of any notice before delivery of the
deposits to the state. However, the owners of the deposits were
entitled to claim them from the state without any limitation of
time. The court held the statute valid and on the question of
due process said-16
"Though notice by publication as well as seizure is necessary in
rem to make a sentence in such proceeding binding on the whole
world, such sentence is one which usually affects ownership by
transferring or extinguishing rights or interest in or to the thing
subject to the jurisdiction. Where, however, title or ownersip is
unaffected and custody only is involved a different situation is pre-
sented. It is one thing to have jurisdiction to take the custody of
property and another to have jurisdiction to hear. and determine a
sentence. Seizure before publication justifies taking the custody of
the res and preserving it, but notice by some other method must
supplement seizure before sentence or condemnation."
In State v. Security Savmngs Bank,17 the court considered
the validity of a statute which required banks to deliver to the
"State v. Phoenix Savings Bank & Trust Co., - Ariz.
132 P (2d) 637 (1942).m277 N. Y. S. 203 (1935).
18Id. at 219.
17154 Pac. 1070 (Cal. App., 1915) See anni tation, 1 A. L. R.
1054, 1056.
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state- treasury- deposits over which there had been no act -of
ownership for twenty years. The statute reqired no publica-
tion of -notice or court proceedings, but, as construed by the
cQurt, allowed the owners of the deposits to clann them from
the state at any time before they were finally disposed of by a
subsequent proceeding taken upon notice. It was contended
that this statute denied due process of law. The court held
the statute valid and on this contention said :18
"In the consideration of this question it is to be noted at the
outset that the section of the Bank Act under review does not con-
template any change in the ownersip of the funds in question. It
purports to deal with possession only, and to leave the matter of their
ultimate ownership to be determined by such subsequent proceedings
as are provided through the reference in the section to the provisions
of section 1234 of the Code of Civil Procedure Reading section
15 of the Bank Act as a whole it must be evident that its only pur-
pose and effect in providing for the summary taking over of un-
claimed deposits by the state treasurer is to merely work a temporary
change in their possession until such time as they may be claimed
by their owners, or as the more ample procedure for their ultimate
disposition outlined in section 1234, Code of Civil Procedure, can be
set in motion; or, in other words, to place such unclaimed deposits
in custodia legis until their ownership can be adjudicated by a
proceeding taken upon such notice to all concerned as would amount
to due process of law, and thus render the adjudication as to the
ultimate control and ownership of the property in question binding
upon all persons interested.
" When the state, from motives of public policy, enacts a
law providing that private property may be summarily seized and
temporarily sequestered to await the inception or determination of a
more formal proceeding affecting the title and ownership of the
property so taken, neither the immediate possessor nor the actual
owner can be heard to urge the objection that the summary seizure
of the property by properly constituted public authorities has been
accomplished without such notice as would constitute due process of
law.
cc It is difficult to see what useful purpose any further noti-
'fication on the part of the state of its intention to turn over these
deposits to its treasury would subserve, than that which has already
been given by the terms of the statute, and acted upon by the re-
spondent in making its verified statements in accordance therewith."
In Commonwealth v. Dollar Savngs Bank,19 there was m
issue the validity of a statute which authorized the state to
take possession of dormant bank deposits, and allowed the
owners thereof an unlimited time m which to recover them
from the state. The statutes did not require any court pro-
28 1.A.L. R, 1054, 1056.
"259 Pa. 138, 102 Atl. 569, 1 A. L. R. 1048 (1917).
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ceedings or publication of notice. The court held that it was
valid and on the question of due process said :20
..... This is neither depriving the depositor of his property nor
taking it for public use within the meaning of either the Federal or
State Constitutions ...
"While, by operation of the Act of 1872, supra, right of action
against the depositary is taken away, yet this is no substantial de-
privation to the owner of the deposit, for instead of that right, as
soon as his money is turned over to the state treasurer, he is af-
forded an action against the Commonwealth and provided with a
court in which, without limitation of time, he may prove his claim.
• . . Since the state, with its power of taxation, is always solvent, it
would be impossible to give better security.
. . . When, as here, such property is taken in charge by the
state, and the owner or his legal representatives are given an un-
limited right to reclaim, with a pledge of all unappropriated moneys
in the public treasury, so far as may be necessary, to repay the
amount thereof when duly proved, this is simply an exercise of
authority over property actually within the jurisdiction of the state
and liable to escheat, for the due protection of all parties in interest,
including the owner; and is in no sense a taking or seizing for public
use within the meaning of the constitutional provisions relied upon
in this case.
"... Since the proceedings on the part of the state to obtain
possession of these deposits were not instituted for the purpose of
declaring an escheat or of passing the property in question over to
another-in short, were not in antagonism to the owners, but for
their benefit-there exists no absolute necessity for any form of
notice to such owners, as the latter are presumed to know that after
expiration of the thirty-year period the Commonwealth, at any
time, may take over the custody of their deposits in the manner pro-
vided by the Act dealing with the subject in hand."
The rationale of these state court cases on the question of
due process is rather difficult to state with exactitude, although
their holdings are clear. From the language used, the validity
of the statutes could well rest on any one of the following
grounds:
(1) There is no substantial deprivation of property when
the owner or his privies are given an unlimited right to claim
from the state all the property received by it or the equivalent
thereof, and, therefore, the due process clauses of the Federal
and State Constitutions are not even brought into play.
(2) The proceedings are in rem or quasi in rem, except
as to the holders of the property who always have actual notice,
and, seizure of the res alone is adequate notice in view of the
'Id. at -, 102 Atl. 569, 571, 1 A. L. R. 1048, 1051 (1917).
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slightness of the deprivation, if any, and all the other circum-
stances.
21
(3) The statutes themselves are alone adequate con-
structive notice because they are prospective in effect and the
property owner has ample opportunity to guard against their
effect.
22
(4) Seizure of the res and the prospectiveness of the
statutes conjointly satisfy due process, although either of them
standing alone nght be insufficient.
However, irrespective of the principle or principles on
which all these state court decisions rest, they clearly support
the validity of statutes which "from motives of public policy"
authorize a state to take, without judicial proceedings or pub-
lication of notice, custody of bank deposits which have been
dormant for a period of time sufficient to make them a proper
subject of police legislation, provided the owner and his privies
are given an unlimited right to reclaim the deposits in full
from the state. These cases also clearly indicate that the extent
of the deprivation, the type of property which is the subject
matter of the legislation and the object or purpose of the leg-
islation are circumstances entitled to great weight on the due
process question. In this respect, they appear to be in accord
'See: Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 68
L. ed. 301 (1923) Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188, 69 L. ed. 568
(1924), Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 492, 48 L. ed.
1092 (1903), Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565, 570 (1877),
Den Murray & Kayser v The Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U. S. 272, 15 L. ed. 372 (1855), Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Peters
466,"7 L. ed. 922 (1830), The Mary, 8 Cranch 388, 3 L. ed. 599 (1814);
Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N. Y. 136, 65 A. L. R. 879, aff'd.,
Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U. S. 318, 74 L. ed. 378 (1929),
Braun v. McPherson, 277 Mich. 396, 269 N. W 211 (1936).
'The depositor can preclude most statutes from taking effect
as to Ins deposits by any simple act of ownership in respect thereto.
For example, under the California statutes involved in Security Sav-
ings Bank, supra, note 5, and the Kentucky statutes involved in
Anderson National Bank v. Reeves, znfra, note 24, any written trans-
action between the bank and the depositor relative to the deposit,
such as the mere giving of the residence of the depositor, will take
the deposit without the purview of the statutes and leave the legal
relationship between the parties status quo. All persons appear to
have ample time in which to guard against the effects of such stat-
utes on their property. Even in the year in which such statutes are
enacted, persons owning deposits which will be affected by them %n
that year will have the time elapsing between the date when such
statutes become effective as law and the date provided therein for
turning the property over to the state in which to take such action
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with the authorities generally for it is well established that such
matters are the very essence of a due process question. 23
In the recent case of Anderson Natwal Bank V. Reeves,
24
a proposition a little different from any yet discussed was pre-
sented. In that case there was in issue the validity of certain
Kentucky statutes which require, after the posting of notice
on the courthouse door or bulletin board, voluntary delivery
of dormant bank deposits to the state, but allow the owners of
the deposits to claim them from the state at any time. The
court held that the statutes are valid and applicable to both
state and national banks. The court said that they would be
valid even in the absence of the provision requiring the posting
of the notice on the courthouse door. The case is particularly
important because of its holding as to national banks. Hence,
the pertinent provisions of the Kentucky statutes will be noted
somewhat in detail as a background for consideration of the
national bank question as well as the due process question. These
provisions are in substance as follows
(1) Where the owner of a bank deposit payable on de-
mand has not for ten successive years next preceding the date
for making reports as required by the Act (a) negotiated in
writing with the bank or trust company concerning it, or (b)
been credited with interest on the pass book or certificate of
deposit on his request, or (e) had a transfer, distribution of
interest, or other transaction noted of record in the books or
records of the bank or trust company, or (d) increased or de-
creased the amount of the deposit, such deposits shall be pre-
sumed abandoned.
as is necessary to preclude the state from receiving their property.
Thereafter, the property owner will have at least one year and may
have the full period of time necessary to make the statutes operative
on his particular property m which to guard against their effects.
For example, if the statute provides that a deposit dormant for
twenty years is presumed abandoned, the owner of a deposit nine-
teen years dormant at the effective date of the act has one year m
which to act, and the owner of a deposit fifteen years dormant on
that date has five years. Knowledge of the statutes is, of course,
presumed. Also, see Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, aff'd. in Corn
Exchange Bank v. Coler, supra, note 21.
"fDohaney v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 74 L. ed. 904 (1929), Miller
v. Shoene, 276 U. S. 272, 72 L. ed. 568 (1927); Jacob v. Roberts, 223
U. S. 261, 56 L. ed. 429 (1911), Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241; 51
L. ed. 461 (1906); 12 C.JA. 1232 (1917) section 1006.
-293 Ky. 735, 170 S.W (2d) 350 (1943).
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(2) The- same presumption of abandonment arises with
respect to.deposits not payable on demand except that the period
of time is twenty-five years instead of ten.
25
- (3) Property presumed abandoned is required to be re-
ported annually to the Department of Revenue on or before
September 1 by the holder thereof as of July 1. A copy of the
report must be-posted on the courthouse door or bulletin board
on or before October 1, and such publication is declared by the
statutes- to be constructive notice to all interested parties and
to be in addition to any other notice provided by statute or
existing as a matter of law.
(4), The person reporting the property must turn it over
to the Department between November 1 and November 15. If,
however, such person or the owner of the property certifies to
the Department by sworn statement that any or.all of the statu-
tory conditions necessary to create a presumption of abandon-
ment no longer exist or never did exist, or certifies the exist-
ence of any fact or circumstance which has a substantial tendency
to rebut such presumption, delivery of the property to the De-
partment is not required unless a court of competent jurisdic-
tion so orders.
(5) The state is given authority to istitute an action
to recover property presumed abandoned whether it has been
reported or not.
(6) Any person clannming an interest in any property held
by the state on a presumption of abandonment may clai it
in full from the state at any time.
(7) Any property held by the state on a presumption
of abandonment may be the subject matter of an action by the
state to establish that the owner died intestate without heirs
or that the property was actually abandoned. However, such
facts must be established .by judicial proceedings pursuant to
the Kentucky Civil Code of Practice. If they are so established,
the state takes a defeasible title to the property, which becomes
absolute at the end of five years, if no claim is made to the
property in that time.
"Other classes of property are declared to be presumed aban-
doned on certain conditions.
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On. the question-of due process, the Kentucky court said :26
were we dealing with an out and out escheat act, " we
would- unhesitatingly say that there can be no escheat except pur-
suant to judicial determination made after legal notice.
"'But such is not the case, notwithstanding appellants' vehement
msistence to the contrary and notwithstanding the fact that the
title of the Act recites that it relates to propery actually or presump-
tively subject to escheat. Certain parts of the Act, as indicated
above, do relate to out and out escheat but before title can become
vested in the state judicial determination is necessary and such
determination must be made after adequate notice since the pro-
ceedings are required to be according to the Civil Code. (Court's
emphasis.)
"9But the portions of the Act dealing with dormant bank deposits
do not provide for a seizure of the deposits and vesting of title or
ownership in the state but merely for a transfer of property which
may later be adjudged to be subject to escheat, and these provi-
sions are for the benefit and protection of both the depositors and
the state.
" The mere taking away of the depositor's right of action
against the bank constitutes no substantial deprivation of property
when, in lieu thereof, he, is afforded an action against the Common-
wealth, the most perfect of all protection.
"It is our conclusion that the controversial portions of the Act
are reasonable (as to the time provided as well as to the procedure)
and that they would not constitute a deprivation of property without
due process of law in violation of the Constitution of the United
States even in the absence of the provision requiring notice to be
posted at the courthouse door. Accordingly, it becomes unnecessary
to discuss the sufficiency of such notice."
The court cited Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Dollar
Savings Bank;27 State v. Security Savings Bank; 2s Proident
Institution for Savings v. Malone;2 9 and Brooklyn Borough Gas
IVompany v. Bennett,30 as fully sustaining its conclusions.
The rationale of this case is also difficult to state "with
exactitude. It may mean that there is, under the Kentucky
statutes, no deprivation sufficient to bring the due process clauses
of the Federal and State Constitutions into play, or, it may
mean that (in view of the slightness of the deprivation, if any,
the purpose of the statutes to preserve property without undue
expense and all the other circumstances) seizure of the res is
adequate notice, or that the statutes, being prospective in effect,
are adequate notice, or that the statutes and seizure of the res
are conjointly adequate notice.
- 293 Ky. 735, 740, 170 S.W (2d) 350, 353 (1943).
-259 Pa. 138, 102 AUt. 569, 1 A. L. R. 1048 (1917) cited supra,
note 19.
154 Pac. 1070 (Cal. App., 1915).
S221 U. S. 660, 55 L. ed. 899 (1910).
277 N. Y. S. 203 (1935) cited supra, note 15.
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However, it is clear that the Kentucky court was so thor-
oughly convinced that the statutes did not deny due process
that it did not feel obliged to dwell on the question whether
the notice posted on the courthouse door was adequate to satisfy
due process. Of course, the case, strictly on its facts, goes no
further than to hold the statutes, which require posting of the
notice, valid.
The contention was also made in this Kentucky case that
the statutes violate section 19 of the Kentucky Constitution
winch prohibits the enactment of any law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts. In disposing of this contention, the court
said :31
c It is not argued that such application of the Act would
result in violation of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution
since this question was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in Provi-
dent Institution for Savings v. Malone, supra, and Security Savings
Bank v. Califorma, 263 U. S. 282, 68 L. ed. 306, wherein it was held
that such statutes are not violative of the contract clause. These
decisions are binding on us as to the federal question but not on the
question of application of the Constitution of this state."
The court, after distinguishing certain Kentucky decisions
relied on by the banks, further stated :32
"In any event, we think the correct conclusion was reached by
the Supreme Court in the two cases referred to."
In Provident Institutwn for Savings v. Malone,3 3 the State
of Massachusetts was attempting to recover bank deposits made
before the effective date of the act. Hence, that case unques-
tionably, as stated by the Kentucky court, lays to rest the ques-
tion whether statutes of the type under consideration violate
article 1, section 10, of the Federal Constitution. These cases
are in accord with the cases generally on the question of im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts, which seem to enun-
ciate the principle that when persons enter into a contract, they
do so with full knowledge that the contract will be affected by
legislation in existence at the time the contract is created or
legislation thereafter enacted, and that such legislation be-
293 Ky. 735, 742, 170 S.W (2d) 350, 354 (1943)
Id. at 743, 170 S.W (2d) 350, 355 (1943)
221 U. S. 660,, 55 L. ed. 899 (1910) cited supra, note 1.
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comes a part of the contract.3 4 Thus, these cases are authority
for the proposition that statutes of this general character do
not impair the obligation of contracts in violation of either the
Federal or State Constitution, and their soundness is hardly
questionable.
THE NATIONAL BANK QUESTION
The facts m First National Bank of San Jose v. Californsa,
3 5
were that the State of California had procured a judgment of
the trial court for a deposit in a national bank on the ground
that it had been dormant or inactive for twenty years m the
manner set out in the California statutes and the judgment
had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of that state. The
sole contention sn the case was that the statute conflicted with
the laws of the United States touching natsonal banks and was
therefore snvalid. The contention was .sustained and the Cali-
forma courts were reversed.
It was contended in Anderson National Bank v. Reeves 36
that the Kentucky statutes conflicted with the national banking
laws and that the San Jose case was conclusive of the question.
However, the court determined that the San Jose case did not
hold that statutes, like those of Kentucky which give depositors
an unlimited right to claim their deposits from the state, con-
flict with the national banking laws, but merely held that
statutes, whsch do not gzve depositors any right to recover their
deposits, cannot apply to national banks. The court stated that
the sole reason for this holding was that the California statutes
attempted to confiscate the deposits and would therefore have
had the effect of causing people to hesitate to place deposits
with national banks.
Since the Kentucky statutes give depositors an unlimited
right to claim their deposits from the state, there can be no
See: Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assoc., 310 U. S. 32, 84
L. ed. 1061 (1939); Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.
398, 78 L. ed. 413, 88 A. L. R. 1481 (1933) Stephenson v. Binford,
287 U. S. 251, 77 L. ed. 288, 87 A. L. R. 721 (1932)
31262 U. S. 366, 67 L. ed. 1030 (1922) cited supra, note 4. Here-
inafter referred to as the San Jose case.
- 293 Ky. 735, 170 S.W (2d) 350 (1943) cited supra, note 24.
Hereinafter referred to as the Anderson National Bank case.
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reasonable. ground for doubt that the Kentucky court ,correctly
deternned that the San Jose case was not conclusive of the
national bank question before it. But, its, holding. .that the
Kentucky statutes are applicable to national banks is, as -a
general proposition, open to question in the absence- of a
decision by the United States Supreme Court, the final author-
ity on that Federal question. Although the San Jose case is
not conclusive of the national bank question presented m the
Anderson National Bank case, there may be some question as to
whether the reasoning thereof should logically apply to the
Kentucky case. With this in mind, the opinion in the San Jose
case will be fully examined, and because of its importance, all
the pertinent language thereof bearing on the -reasons for the
decision is quoted below .37
"The supreme court declined to express an 'opinion upon the
question whether the judgment of the superior court herein operates
as a present escheat of the rights of the several depositors against
the respective banks, or whether under section 1272 they each still
have the right within the time there stated to prosecute an action
to obtain payment of their several deposits from the state treasurer,'
and said, 'If they have such right the judgment of the superior court
would not be a bar thereto.'
"Section 5136, U. S. Revised Statutes, Comp. Stat., section 9661,
6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 654, confers upon national banks power
to receive deposits, which necessarily implies the right to accept
loans of money, promising to repay upon demand to lender or his
order. These banks are instrumentalities of the Federal govern-
ment. Their contracts and dealings are subject to the operation of
general and undiscrimnating state laws which do not conflict with
the letter or-the general object and purposes of congressional legis-
lation. But any attempt by a state to define their duties or control
the conduct of their affairs is void whenever it conflicts with the
laws of the United States or frustrates the purposes of the national
-legislation or impairs the efficiency of the bank to discharge the
duties for which it was created. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161
U. S. 275, 283, 288, 290, 40 L. ed. 700-703, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502.
"'National banks organized under the act are instruments de-
signed to be used to aid the government in the administration of
an important branch of the public service. They are means ap-
propriate to that end. Being such means, brought into existence
for this purpose, and intended to be so employed, the states can
exercise no control over them, nor in any wise affect their operation,
except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit. Anything
beyond this is 'an abuse, because it is the usurpation of power which
a single state cannot give.' Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Dearing,
91 U. S. 29, 33, 34, 23 L. ed. 196, 198, 199.
"Congressional legislation in respect of national banks 'has in
view the erection of a system extending throughout the country, and
independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legis-
'First National Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366,
67 L. ed. 1030, 1034, .1035. (1922) cited supra, note 4.
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latibn which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose lir-itations
and restrictions as various and as numerous as the states.' Easton
v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 229, 47 L. ed. 452, 456, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288, 12
Am. Crin. Rep. 522.
"Plainly, no state may prohibit national banks from accepting
deposits or directly impair their efficiency in that regard. And we
think, under circumstances like those here revealed, a state may
not dissolve contracts of deposit, even after twenty years, and re-
quire national banks to pay to it the amounts then due; the settled
principles stated above oppose such power.
" foes the statute conflict with the letter or general object and
purposes of the legislation by Congress? Obviously, it attenpts. to
qualify in an unusual way agreements between national banks and
their customers, long understood to arise when the former receive
deposits under their plainly granted powers. If California may thus
interfere other states may do likewise; and, instead of twenty years,
varying limitations may be prescribed,--three years perhaps, or five,
or ten,. or fifteen. We cannot conclude that Congress intended to
permit such results. They seem incompatible with the purpose to
establish a system of governmental agencies specifically empowered
and expected freely to accept deposits from customers irrespective
of domicile with the commonly consequent duties and liabilities.
The depositors of a national bank often live in many different states
and countries; and certainly it would not be an immaterial thing
if the deposits of all were subject to seizure by the state where the
bank happened to be located. The success of almost all commercial
banks depends upon their ability to obtain loans from depositors, and
these might well hesitate to subject their funds to possible con-
fiscation."
It is clearly stated above in substance that the confiscatory
feature of the California statute will cause people not to make
deposits and therefore materially interfere with the business
of national banks. Hence, it will be assumed herein without
further comment that this effect was, at least, a reason for the
inapplicability of these statutes to national banks, but the
question whether this was the sole reason, as held by the Ken-
tucky court, will require further consideration.
The question asked by the court itself in the San Jose case,
"Does the statute conflict with the letter or general object and
purposes of the legislation by Congress'" and the court's an-
swer tends to suggest, on casual reading, that the court held
the California statutes inapplicable to national banks on an
additional ground, namely, that the statutes attempted to
qualify their contracts of deposit. This -does not appear to be
a proper construction of the court's language. The court did
not say that contracts of national banks are immune from
qualification by state legislation. In fact, it said .38
"-. Their contracts and dealings are subject to the operation
6o.general and undiscriminating state laws which do not conflict with
I Id. at 1035. -
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the letter or the general object and purposes of Congressional legis-
lation."
Such laws, as prevwusly noted, actually become a part of
the contract and are an obligation thereof--not an zmpair-
ment.
40
Hence, it was knowledge of the fact that the Califorma
statutes, if valid, would qualify the contracts and that such
qualification would be valid unless it conflicted with the "object
or purposes" of national banks, which caused the court to even
mention the fact that these statutes attempted to qualify the
contracts of deposit. However, it is most significant that the
language used by the court in this connection places emphasis
on the "unusual way" in which the statutes attempted to qualify
the "agreements." The words "in an unusual way" when read
in connection with the other language of the opinion, show that
the statutes were held inapplicable to national banks solely be-
cause of the "way" they attempted to qualify their contracts.
To ascertain the "unusual way" in which the contracts
would be qualified by the statutes, it was necessary for the court
to look to the substance of the statutes because they, if valid,
would constitute the qualifying provisions which would by opera-
tion of law be interpolated into the contracts.
The contracts, with the statutes read into them, would
provide that when a depositor fails for twenty years to make
some transaction of record indicating ownership of his deposit,
it, for that reason, becomes subject to outright escheat by the
state.4 ' This was the "unusual way" in which the court found
that the statutes attempted to qualify the contracts.
"The same principle is stated more fully in McClelland v. Chip-
man, 164 U. S. 347, 41 L. ed. 461 (1896), as follows:
" The purpose and object of Congress in enacting the na-
tional bank law was to leave such banks as to their contracts in gen-
eral under the operation of the state law, and thereby invest them
as Federal agencies with local strength, while, at the same time,
preserving them from undue state interference wherever Congress
within the limits of its constitutional authority has expressly so
directed, or wherever such state interference frustrates the lawful
purpose of Congress or impairs the efficiency of the banks to dis-
charge the duties imposed upon them by the law of the United
States."
"See cases cited supra, note 34.
' This is true because the Supreme Court stated in the San Jose
case that since the California courts had not said whether the de-
positors had the right to recover the deposits, under section 1273 of
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It necessarily follows that the effect of these "unusuaZ"
provmsons sn the contract would be to cause people-not to make
deposits sn banks because of fear of possible confiscation, for,
according to the court, such would be the effect of the statutes.
Thus, the statutes were held 'nvalid not because of any qualify-
sng effect which they would have on the contracts as such, but
because of the effect the contracts, as qualified, would have on
the business of the banks-the curtailment of the making of
deposits.
The soundness of this conclusion is fully manifested by
the decision in Security Savings Bank v. California.4 2 As pre-
viously noted, the sole contention m that case was that these
same California statutes impaired the obligation of contracts
existing between state banks and their customers, and therefore
violated the contract clause of article 1, section 10 of the United
States Constitution. Tins is the only clause of the United States
Constitution winch protects contracts as such. There is noth-
ing in it winch gives the contracts of national banks or federal
instrumentalities any more protection against state legislation
than is afforded contracts of state banks. The contracts in-
volved in the Security Savings Bank case and in the San Jose
case were, in substance, identical. Yet, when the Supreme Court
held in the Security Savings Bank case that these California
statutes did not have any unconstitutional effect on contracts
with state banks, it reaffirmed by a mere footnote, without dis-
cussion, the decision in the San Jose case. Tins indicates that
the court did not construe the San Jose case as holding the
statutes inapplicable to national banks because of any effect
they had on the contracts of deposit. Unless this be true, the
reasoning of the cases is inconsistent, winch, it must be pre-
sumed, was not the intention of the court.
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the California Code, the statutes must be treated as if no such right
existed. Even if such right did exist, it was limited by section 1273
to five years.
1263 U. S. 282, 68 L. ed. 301 (1923) cited supra, note 5. Here-
mafter referred to as the Security Savings Bank case.
"It is no answer to this line of reasoning to say that it was not
even contended in the San Jose case that the contract clause of the
United States Constitution was violated. In considering solely the
contention before it, the court could have found that the statutes
impaired the obligation of contracts, if such were a fact, and that
this was a frustration of the business of national banks; or, that the
contracts of national banks were totally immune to state laws, if
such were the law.
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In Starr v. O'Connor4 4 the court, speaking with reference
to the San Jose case and certain Michigan statutes, said, when
holding the Michigan statutes inapplicable to national banks,
that
The Michigan statutes resemble the invalid Califorma act
in being closer km to illegitimate laws of forfeiture than to legiti-
mate laws of escheat.""
This statement may indicate that the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit thought, as did the
Kentucky court, that the Califorma statutes were held invalid
as to national banks because of their confiscatory effects. The
Kentucky court quoted the statement in the Anderson National
Bank case with. the comment that it might be significant.
It was suggested in the briefs for the banks in the Ander-
son National Bank case that the California statutes were held
inapplicable to national banks on a ground not yet discussed,
viz. That there was no assurance that statutes of the various
states dealing with dormant bank deposits would contain urn-
form provisions. The basis for this suggestion lies entirely in
the following language of the opinion :46
" If Califoria may thus znterfere, other states may do like-
wise; and, instead of twenty years, varying limitations may be pre-
scribed-three years perhaps, or five, or ten, or fifteen. We cannot
conclude that Congress intended to permit such results. They seem
incompatible with the purpose to establish a system of governmental
agencies specifically empowered and expected freely to accept de-
posits from their customers irrespective of domicile with the com-
monly consequent duties of liability"
This language does not appear to sustain the suggestion.
The antecedent of the words "thus interfere," "such results,"
'118 F (2d) 548 (1941).
Id. at 557.
The facts in this case were as follows: The First National Bank
of Detroit was in receivership. There were 123,879 separate deposit
balances totaling $1,799,079.66 upon which no claims had been pre-
sented to and accepted by the receiver. The State of Michigan was
attempting to escheat these deposits under its statutes. But, it was
confronted with an act of Congress, 12 U. S. C. A. sections 192, 193,
194, 197 and 264 (in) (3), which provide in substance that any
unclaimed deposits go into the general fund of the bank to be paid
first to creditors and depositors of the bank and then to the share-
holders. Since Congress had legislated with respect to unclaimed
deposits held by a national bank in receivership but had not done so
with respect to banks not in receivership, that case is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the Anderson National Bank case.
"First National Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366,
67 L. ed. 1030, 1035 (1922) cited supra, note 4.
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and "they" is qualification of agreements "in an unusual way."
These words link this language to the confiscatory aspect of the
statutes already discussed, and so does the concluding sentence
of the above quotation which states, in substance, that the
effect of the statutes is to curtail the free acceptance of deposits.-
The way m which acceptance of deposits is interfered with. is
given in the next two succeeding sentences of the opinion and
is, as already stated, that people would hesitate to make deposits
because of fear of confiscation. Therefore, when the court
used the words "three years perhaps, or five, or ten, or fifteen,"
it had in mind only statutes which attempt to confiscate deposits
on the ground that they have been dormant for the suggested
periods of time.
To what extent or degree, if any, state laws must be uni-
form to be applicable to federal instrumentalities is a broad
and complex, if not novel, question. If the question be limited
to national banks only, it would still be broad in scope and
merely one aspect of the general question. The breadth of that
question may be illustrated by the question. Do state statutes
relating to personal representatives, descent and distribution,
wills, conveyances, limitation of actions, etc., which are not
uniform in their provisions and effects have any application to
national banks 2
If the court in the San Jose case meant to say, as a gen-
eral proposition, that statutes of no state attempting to make
any disposition of dormant bank deposits can apply to national
banks because they might not be uniform in their provisions
with statutes of other states, it stands to reason that it would
have either pointed out the reason why-the specific ill effect
not common to other statutes which lack of uniformity in such
laws would have on national banks-or have made it clear thlat
it was enunciating a new and revolutionary general principle
relative to the immunity of national banks, or, perhaps other
federal instrumentalities, from state legislation. The court's
failure so to do is indicative of the fact that it intended the
language relied on by the banks to have its literal construction
only and to limit it entirely to the particular facts of the San
Jose case. Surely, lack of uniformity was not the point on
which the San Jose case turned, the court just did not say
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enough, if anything, about lack of uniformity, for that to be
true.
All the language of the San Jose case, which might con-
ceivably assert any reason or reasons for the court's decision, has
now been discussed. Hence, the conclusion is inevitable that
the Kentucky court properly construed the case as holding the
California statutes inapplicable to national banks solely because
of the effect which confiscation of deposits on the mere ground
of dormancy would have on the banks.
On the basis of this construction, it is clear that if the Ken-
tucky statutes are inapplicable to national banks, it must be
for a reason not expressed m the San Jose case. The banks did
not call to the court's attention in the Anderson National Bank
case any ill effect of the Kentucky statutes on national banks
which was sufficient to warrant discussion in the opinion. They
merely contended that the ill effect of the California statutes
on national banks was common to the Kentucky statutes. In
final analysis, their case was bottomed entirely on the San Jose
case. 4 7
In support of the validity of the Kentucky statutes, it was
argued in briefs for the state that the statutes would have a
good effect on national banks in that depositors would recognize
the tendency of the statutes to protect them, their heirs and
devisees, against loss of deposits from forgetfulness, neglect or
some other inadvertence, and, therefore, tend to cause people
to make deposits rather than to decline so to do. This argument
was of course speculative and drew no comment from the court.
It was also argued that much weight should be given to the
fact that it is dormant inactive deposits which are the subject
matter of the Kentucky statutes and that the state does not
attempt to meddle in any way with current deposits, that
logically there ought to be a time when the banks can make a
final disposition of dead deposits, but, even Congress cannot
empower them to take such deposits as a profit or escheat, for
I The banks relied on American National Bank of Nashville v.
Clarke (175 Tenn. 480, 135 S.W [2d] 935 [1940] ) but the decision
in that case is based entirely on the San Jose case and no discussion
of the point on which the Anderson National Bank case turned is
made thereto. The banks also relied on Starr v. O'Connor, 118 F.
(2d) 548 (1941), supra, but that case was distinguishable from the
Anderson National Bank case. See note 45.
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the Federal Government has no power to escheat outside its
territorial jurisdietion.
4 8
Hence, it was argued that the Kentucky statutes redound
to the benefit of both state and national banks in that they
enable them to make a final accounting of an account which
might otherwise reach the ripe old age of a thousand years or
more, or become a potential inducement to officers to embezzle
or make other illegal maipulations in respect to it.
There are many analogies which tend to support the view
that the Kentucky statutes would not materially interfere with
thxe business of national banks, some of which are briefly dis-
cussed below.
Under laws relating to personal representatives, many of
the states authorize the personal representative to take custody
of or title to the property of an infant or an insane person for
his benefit. The net result in such cases is that the bank loses
or may lose use of the deposit and is relieved of accounting
directly to the depositor. The same results occur if a bank
deposit passes under, the laws of a state relating to wills or
descent and distribution. These results are not materially dif-
ferent from those of the Kentucky statutes m controversy Under
those statutes the state itself, acting in the capacity of a per-
sonal representative,4 9 takes custody of the deposits for the
benefit of the owner or his privies, the bank, if it complies with
the law, loses use of the deposit and is not required to account
directly to the depositor.
In Territory of Alaska v. First NationaZ Bank of Fair-
banks,5 0 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the Territory could escheat deposits
m a national bank on the ground that the depositor had died
intestate without heirs. It was contended that the statute
under which the Territory was proceeding conflicted with the
national banking laws. But, the- court did not consider the
mere loss of the use of the deposit or payment thereof to the
state instead of the depositor to be a material frustration of the
business of national banks.5 1
' American Loan Co. v. Grand R. Co., 159 Fed. 775 (1908).
':See Provident Savings Institution v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660,
55 L. ed. 899 (1910) cited supra, note 1.
822 Fed. (2d) 377 (1927).
'See also United States v Klein (303 U. S. 276, 82 L. ed. 840
(1938)) wherein it is held that it is no interference with a federal
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If statutes like those involved in the Alaska case, the others
mentioned above, and many others that could be mentioned,
are applicable to national banks, it is difficult to assign a reason
for saying that the Kentucky statutes, whose effects are sub-
stantiaZly the same, are not applicable to them.
To attempt to attribute to the Kentucky statutes ill effects
on national banks, which are not common to other statutes gen-
erally considered applicable to them, would be to enter the
field of mere speculation. Apparently, it takes more than a
mere speculative reason to make a state statute inapplicable to
a federal instrumentality, for the court recogmzes degrees of
interference, and if the interference is not real and substantial,
the statute will not be stricken down. 52 Thus, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the Kentucky court has correctly determined in
the Anderson National Bank case that the Kentucky statutes do
not materially interfere with the business of national banks or
conflict with the national legislation relating to them. 53 The case
will, at least, be an interesting one to follow in the event it
reaches the United States Supreme Court.
instrumentality. The United States Treasury allowed a state to
escheat funds which had been turned over to it pursuant to Federal
statutes (R. S. 996) relating to unclaimed funds held by Federal
district courts for distribution.
'Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 465, 83 L. ed. 927 (1938).
'In State v. First Nat'l. Bank of Portland, 61 Ore. 551, 123 Pac.
712 (1912), statutes which authorize the state of Oregon to take
dormant bank deposits for the benefit of the owners were held valid.
That case, although decided prior to the San Jose case, was not m
effect overruled by it because the Oregon statutes, like the Kentucky
statutes, differ materially from the California statutes. However,
the Kentucky case was selected for consideration in detail herem
because it was decided subsequent to the San Jose case, and the
court distinguished the San Jose case from the Kentucky case on a
point not discussed in the Oregon case.
